Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory

Oxford University Press (2000)
Is there a limit to the legitimate demands of morality? In particular, is there a limit to people's responsibility to promote the well-being of others, either directly or via social institutions? Utilitarianism admits no such limit, and is for that reason often said to be an unacceptably demanding moral and political view. In this original new study, Murphy argues that the charge of excessive demands amounts to little more than an affirmation of the status quo. The real problem with utilitarianism is that it makes unfair demands on people who comply with it in our world of nonideal compliance. Murphy shows that this unfairness does not arise on a collective understanding of our responsibility for others' well being. Thus, according to Murphy, while there is no general problem to be raised about the extent of moral demands, there is a pressing need to acknowledge the collective nature of the demands of beneficence.
Keywords Benevolence  Social ethics  Utilitarianism
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Call number BJ1474.M87 2000
ISBN(s) 0195079760   0195171950   9780195171952
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Vanessa Carbonell (2012). The Ratcheting-Up Effect. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):228-254.

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