On Fodor's analogy: Why psychology is like philosophy of science after all

Mind and Language 21 (5):553-564 (2006)
Abstract
Jerry Fodor has argued that a modular mind must include central systems responsible for updating beliefs, and has defended this position by appealing to shared properties of belief fixation and scientific confirmation. Peter Carruthers and Stephen Pinker have attacked this analogy between science and ordinary inference. I examine their arguments and show that they fail. This does not show that Fodor's more general position is correct
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Bill Wringe (2011). Cognitive Individualism and the Child as Scientist Program. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 42 (4):518-529.
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