David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind and Language 21 (5):553-564 (2006)
Jerry Fodor has argued that a modular mind must include central systems responsible for updating beliefs, and has defended this position by appealing to shared properties of belief fixation and scientific confirmation. Peter Carruthers and Stephen Pinker have attacked this analogy between science and ordinary inference. I examine their arguments and show that they fail. This does not show that Fodor's more general position is correct
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Bill Wringe (2011). Cognitive Individualism and the Child as Scientist Program. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 42 (4):518-529.
Similar books and articles
Irene Appelbaum (1998). Fodor, Modularity, and Speech Perception. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):317-330.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2002). On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
Ron McClamrock (1991). Methodological Individualism Considered as a Constitutive Principle of Scientific Inquiry. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):343-54.
Steven Pinker (2005). So How Does the Mind Work? Mind and Language 20 (1):1-38.
S. Okasha (2003). Fodor on Cognition, Modularity, and Adaptationism. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):68-88.
Jacob J. Ross (1990). Against Postulating Central Systems in the Mind. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):297-312.
L. M. Russow (1993). Fodor, Adams, and Causal Properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.
Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Is the Mind Really Modular? In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. 22--36.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #49,053 of 1,088,831 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,665 of 1,088,831 )
How can I increase my downloads?