David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind and Language 21 (5):553-564 (2006)
Jerry Fodor has argued that a modular mind must include central systems responsible for updating beliefs, and has defended this position by appealing to shared properties of belief fixation and scientific confirmation. Peter Carruthers and Stephen Pinker have attacked this analogy between science and ordinary inference. I examine their arguments and show that they fail. This does not show that Fodor's more general position is correct
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Bill Wringe (2011). Cognitive Individualism and the Child as Scientist Program. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 42 (4):518-529.
Similar books and articles
L. M. Russow (1993). Fodor, Adams, and Causal Properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.
Jacob J. Ross (1990). Against Postulating Central Systems in the Mind. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):297-312.
S. Okasha (2003). Fodor on Cognition, Modularity, and Adaptationism. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):68-88.
Steven Pinker (2005). So How Does the Mind Work? Mind and Language 20 (1):1-38.
Ron McClamrock (1991). Methodological Individualism Considered as a Constitutive Principle of Scientific Inquiry. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):343-54.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2002). On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
Irene Appelbaum (1998). Fodor, Modularity, and Speech Perception. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):317-330.
Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Is the Mind Really Modular? In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. 22--36.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads37 ( #64,560 of 1,696,303 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #177,943 of 1,696,303 )
How can I increase my downloads?