David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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MIT Press (2005)
In _ Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, _Dominic Murphy looks at psychiatry from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy of science, considering three issues: how we should conceive of, classify, and explain mental illness. If someone is said to have a mental illness, what about it is mental? What makes it an illness? How might we explain and classify it? A system of psychiatric classification settles these questions by distinguishing the mental illnesses and showing how they stand in relation to one another. This book explores the philosophical issues raised by the project of explaining and classifying mental illness. Murphy argues that the current literature on mental illness -- exemplified by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders -- is an impediment to research; it lacks a coherent concept of the mental and a satisfactory account of disorder, and yields too much authority to commonsense thought about the mind. He argues that the explanation of mental illness should meet the standards of good explanatory practice in the cognitive neurosciences, and that the classification of mental disorders should group symptoms into conditions based on the causal structure of the normal mind
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Citations of this work BETA
John M. Doris (2009). Skepticism About Persons. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.
Richard Dub (2015). Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2).
Jonathan Y. Tsou (2007). Hacking on the Looping Effects of Psychiatric Classifications: What is an Interactive and Indifferent Kind? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):329 – 344.
Philip Gerrans (2013). Delusional Attitudes and Default Thinking. Mind and Language 28 (1):83-102.
Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon (2014). Emotion, Utility Maximization, and Ecological Rationality. Mind and Society 13 (2):227-245.
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