Graduate studies at Western
Dialectica 60 (2):195-205 (2006)
|Abstract||Conceivability is an important source of our beliefs about what is possible; inconceivability is an important source of our beliefs about what is impossible. What are the connections between the reliability of these sources? If one is reliable, does it follow that the other is also reliable? The central contention of this paper is that suitably qualified the reliability of inconceivability implies the reliability of conceivability, but the reliability of conceivability fails to imply the reliability of inconceivability|
|Keywords||Conceivability Connection Epistemology Possibility Reliability|
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