Spontaneity and freedom in Leibniz
| Abstract | Historically, those who are committed to libertarianism are usually so committed for at least one of two reasons. First, some are convinced that the very idea of an agent acting freely and responsibly is incoherent when sufficient conditions for the choice obtain, whether internal or external to the agent. If, it is claimed, the choice of the agent can be traced back to states of affairs which are sufficient for the choice, the choice is simply a consequence of those conditions, and this not an act of the agent himself. As a result, such choices are neither free nor something for which the agent is morally responsible. | |||||||||
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