The Folk Epistemology of Delusions

Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22 (2012)
Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms
Keywords Delusion  Folk psychology  Belief
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DOI 10.1007/s12152-011-9125-5
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Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Shaking the Bedrock. Philosophy Psychiatry Psychology 18 (1):77-87.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2004). Interpreting Delusions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.

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