Graduate studies at Western
Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22 (2012)
|Abstract||Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms|
|Keywords||Delusion Folk psychology Belief|
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