David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Human Studies 27 (4):417 - 427 (2004)
In this article I will address the question of determining the moral limits of reproductive decisions. In so doing I will examine the contributions made by John Harris, who has over the years consistently addressed the ethical implications of advancing reproductive technologies. In addressing these matters, Harris has centred his arguments on the principle of harm and with this in mind has set out a specific theoretical framework from which decisions about disability and causing harm, as in the case of reproductive decisions, can be rationally addressed. This discussion will attempt to question the conceptual scheme that he proposes. The aim here is not to present an alternative theoretical contribution to the morality of reproductive choice. Rather, in the attempt to follow some of the directives in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the aim is to demonstrate some of the pitfalls of what Wittgenstein has described as the “craving for generality” in contemporary philosophy. I propose that this craving can distort, in this instance, our ordinary usage of concepts such as harm, suffering and disability and their role in the moral vocabulary of reproductive decision making.
|Keywords||ethics harm Harris John moral action reproduction|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Raimond Gaita (1991). Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. St. Martin's Press.
John Harris (1985). The Value of Life. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
John Harris (1992). Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford University Press.
Peter Winch (1972). Ethics and Action. London,Routledge and Kegan Paul.
J. Harris (2001). One Principle and Three Fallacies of Disability Studies. Journal of Medical Ethics 27 (6):383-387.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John R. Spencer & Antje Du Bois-Pedain (eds.) (2006). Freedom and Responsibility in Reproductive Choice. Hart Pub..
Thérèse Murphy (2009). The Texture of Reproductive Choice : Law, Ethnography, and Reproductive Technologies. In New Technologies and Human Rights. Oxford University Press
G. M. Murtagh (2007). Ethical Reflection on the Harm in Reproductive Decision-Making. Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (12):717-720.
C. F. Gethmann & F. Thiele (2001). Moral Arguments Against the Cloning of Humans. Poiesis and Praxis 1 (1):35-46.
Helga Kuhse (2001). Should Cloning Be Banned for the Sake of the Child? Poiesis and Praxis 1 (1):17-33.
Janet Malek (2006). Identity, Harm, and the Ethics of Reproductive Technology. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (1):83 – 95.
Robert Sparrow (2008). Is It “Every Man's Right to Have Babies If He Wants Them”?: Male Pregnancy and the Limits of Reproductive Liberty. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 18 (3):pp. 275-299.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #286,939 of 1,796,251 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #468,795 of 1,796,251 )
How can I increase my downloads?