Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 57 (2):278-289 (1990)
|Abstract||This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of "going beyond" is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are purely inductive|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brian Skyrms (1991). Carnapian Inductive Logic for Markov Chains. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):439 - 460.
James Cussens (1996). Deduction, Induction and Probabilistic Support. Synthese 108 (1):1 - 10.
Andrew Elby (1994). Contentious Contents: For Inductive Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):193-200.
P. T. Landsberg & J. Wise (1988). Components of Probabilistic Support: The Two-Proposition Case. Philosophy of Science 55 (3):402-414.
Peter Railton (1978). A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation. Philosophy of Science 45 (2):206-226.
Manfred Jaeger (2005). A Logic for Inductive Probabilistic Reasoning. Synthese 144 (2):181 - 248.
John D. Norton (2010). Cosmic Confusions: Not Supporting Versus Supporting Not. Philosophy of Science 77 (4):501-523.
Georg J. W. Dorn (1995). Inductive Countersupport. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (1):187 - 189.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads7 ( #142,372 of 739,324 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?