David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613 (2009)
In this article I examine the consequences of the dominance of intuitive thinking in moral judging and deciding for the role of moral reasoning in moral education. I argue that evidence for the reliability of moral intuitions is lacking. We cannot determine when we can trust our intuitive moral judgements. Deliberate and critical reasoning is needed, but it cannot replace intuitive thinking. Following Robin Hogarth, I argue that intuitive judgements can be improved. The expertise model for moral development, proposed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, not only teaches us how we acquire intuitive moral judgements, it also shows the interconnectedness of intuitive thinking and deliberate reasoning. Analysing the expertise model in more detail, I show that it cannot do justice to the importance of reasoning skills. Reasoning skills are needed because we expect people to be able to argue for their standpoints. I conclude that moral education should not only aim at improving intuitive moral judgements, but also at acquiring reasoning skills.
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Baron (1994). Nonconsequentialist decisions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):1.
Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus (1991). Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise. Human Studies 14 (4):229 - 250.
Jonathan Haidt (2001). The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail. Psychological Review 108 (4):Psychological Review.
Michael Huemer (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan.
Michael Huemer (2008). Revisionary Intuitionism. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
Citations of this work BETA
Hanno Sauer (2012). Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and Rationality in Moral Judgement. Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.
Ben Eggleston (2014). Accounting for the Data: Intuitions in Moral Theory Selection. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):761-774.
Karin Murris (2012). Student Teachers Investigating the Morality of Corporal Punishment in South Africa. Ethics and Education 7 (1):45 - 58.
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