David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (4):473 - 504 (2005)
The paper shows how ideas that explain the sense of an expression as a method or algorithm for finding its reference, preshadowed in Frege’s dictum that sense is the way in which a referent is given, can be formalized on the basis of the ideas in Thomason (1980). To this end, the function that sends propositions to truth values or sets of possible worlds in Thomason (1980) must be replaced by a relation and the meaning postulates governing the behaviour of this relation must be given in the form of a logic program. The resulting system does not only throw light on the properties of sense and their relation to computation, but also shows circular behaviour if some ingredients of the Liar Paradox are added. The connection is natural, as algorithms can be inherently circular and the Liar is explained as expressing one of those. Many ideas in the present paper are closely related to those in Moschovakis (1994), but receive a considerably lighter formalization.
|Keywords||Linguistics Philosophy of Language Artificial Intelligence Computational Linguistics Semantics Syntax|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael A. E. Dummett (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1947/1956). Meaning and Necessity. University of Chicago Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Jon Barwise (1987). The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford University Press.
M. J. Cresswell (1985). Structured Meanings. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Bjørn Jespersen & Massimiliano Carrara (2013). A New Logic of Technical Malfunction. Studia Logica 101 (3):547-581.
Graeme Forbes (2010). Intensional Verbs in Event Semantics. Synthese 176 (2):227 - 242.
Carl Pollard (2015). Agnostic Hyperintensional Semantics. Synthese 192 (3):535-562.
Bartosz Więckowski (2015). Constructive Belief Reports. Synthese 192 (3):603-633.
Shalom Lappin & Chris Fox (2015). Type-Theoretic Logic with an Operational Account of Intensionality. Synthese 192 (3):563-584.
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