Exclusivism, eternal damnation, and the problem of evil: A critique of Craig's molinist soteriological theodicy
Graduate studies at Western
Religious Studies 39 (4):407-419 (2003)
|Abstract||According to orthodox Christianity, salvation depends on faith in Christ. If, however, God eternally punishes those who die ignorant of Christ, it appears that we have special instance of the problem of evil: the punishment of the religiously innocent. This is called the soteriological problem of evil. Using Molina's concept of middle knowledge, William Lane Craig develops a solution to this problem which he considers a theodicy. As developed by Craig, the Molinist theodicy rests on the problematic assumption that all informed persons who would freely reject Christ are culpable. Using an informed Muslim as a counter-example, I try to show that Craig's Molinist solution begs the question.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
William Lane Craig (2003). Response to David Myers. Religious Studies 39 (4):421-426.
David B. Myers (2003). Rejoinder to William Lane Craig. Religious Studies 39 (4):427-430.
Charles Seymour (2000). A Craigian Theodicy of Hell. Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):103-115.
Lars Fr H. Svendsen (2010). A Philosophy of Evil. Dalkey Archive Press.
Raymond J. VanArragon (2001). Transworld Damnation and Craig's Contentious Suggestion. Faith and Philosophy 18 (2):241-260.
Brett Gaul (2004). Is the Problem of Evil a Problem for Descartes? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:209-220.
R. Zachary Manis (2011). Could God Do Something Evil? A Molinist Solution to the Problem of Divine Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 28 (2):209-223.
Rik Peels (2006). Divine Foreknowledge and Eternal Damnation: The Theory of Middle Knowledge as Solution to the Soteriological Problem of Evil. Neue Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 48 (2):160-75.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #55,929 of 757,557 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,427 of 757,557 )
How can I increase my downloads?