Peirce and the concept of reality
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1):95-101 (1983)
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Douglas Greenlee (1973). Peirce's Concept of Sign. The Hague,Mouton.
Robert Stern (2007). Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness. Inquiry 50 (2):123 – 155.
James E. Broyles (1965). Charles S. Peirce and the Concept of Indubitable Belief. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 1 (2):77-89.
Bernardo Canteñs (2004). Overcoming the Evidentialist's Challenge: Peirce's Conjectures of Instinctive Reason and the Reality of God. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 40 (4):771 - 786.
B. Gresham Riley (1968). Existence, Reality, & Objects of Knowledge: A Defense of C. S. Peirce as a Realist. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 4 (1):34 - 48.
Ilya Farber (2005). Peirce on Reality, Truth, and the Convergence of Inquiry in the Limit. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (3):541 - 566.
Isabel Stearns (1968). The Apparent Amphiboly of Peirce's Reality. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 4 (2):80 - 89.
Bernardo J. Canteñs (2002). Peirce and the Spontaneous Conjectures of Instinctive Reason. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:89-101.
Jeff Foss (1984). Reflections on Peirce's Concepts of Testability and the Economy of Research. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:28 - 39.
Gérard Deledalle (1992). Peirce's "Sign": Its Concept and Its Use. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 28 (2):289 - 301.
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