David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):3 – 11 (1923)
(1)Four varieties of primitive affect are distinguishable, characterised by (a) strain, and (b) relaxation in response to a favourable situation, and by (c) strain, and (d) relaxation in response to one unfavourable. Exhilaration, gladness and interest arise from (a); ease, bliss and contentment from (b); uneasiness, distress and repugnance from (c), depression, sadness and apathy from (d). (2)These affects are due to (i) the organic harmony or discord induced by the environment; wherewith are evoked (ii) innately purposive patterns of out-going locomotor and organic activity, partly self-controlled and producing organic sensations; the latter again induce (iii) organic harmony or discord. Self-activity is “affected” by (i), (ii) and (iii). An innate basis is afforded by (i) and (ii) for the affect, which is completely developed by (iii) derived from actual expression. (3)Instincts are integrated from different higher and lower reflexes, emotions from different instincts, sentiments from different emotions organized within progressively higher systems and subjected to control and inhibition, which are important determinants of the accompanying feeling. In the lowest reflexes the self is “affected” only by (iii). The higher reflexes are accompanied by the affects evoked as described above in (2). Instincts, emotions and sentiments are accom panied by their special feelings depending on the integration of dispositions to lower feelings and on (ii) and (iii).
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Joel J. Kupperman (1995). An Anti-Essentialist View of the Emotions. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):341-351.
M. K. Spehn & L. M. Reder (2000). The Unconscious Feeling of Knowing: A Commentary on Koriat's Paper. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):187-192.
Demian Whiting (2006). Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
David Pugmire (2005). Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
Robert C. Solomon (2004). Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as Engagements with the World. In Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press 1-18.
A. Koriat (2000). The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):149-171.
Laura Sizer (2006). What Feelings Can't Do. Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.
Demian Whiting (2011). The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality. Oxford University Press.
Irwin Goldstein (2002). Are Emotions Feelings? A Further Look at Hedonic Theories of Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #215,417 of 1,700,306 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?