Fringe benefits, side effects, and indifference: A reply to Feltz

Abstract
In a previous paper, I suggested that if an agent is a morally praiseworthy person and one of the consequences of the action she knowingly brings about is morally positive, then this consequence isn’t really a side effect for the agent. Adam Feltz has recently developed a case that purportedly puts pressure on my account of side effects. In the present paper, I am going to argue that Feltz’s purported counter-example fails to undermine my view even if it happens to shed new light on the difference between negative side effects and positive fringe benefits. After responding to Feltz’s criticisms, I will conclude by presenting the results of a pilot study that provide prima facie support for my view.
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