Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586 (2006)
|Abstract||According to the analysis of intentional action that Michael Bratman has dubbed the 'Simple View', intending to x is necessary for intentionally x-ing. Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that when people are presented with cases involving moral considerations, they are much more likely to judge that the action (or side effect) in question was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that the agent intended to do it. This suggests that at least as far as the ordinary concept of intentional action is concerned, an agent need not intend to x in order to x intentionally|
|Keywords||INTENTIONAL ACTION MORAL RESPONSIBILITY ORDINARY LANGUAGE FOLK PSYCHOLOGY FREE WILL INTUITIONS JUDGMENT|
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