On trying to save the simple view
Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586 (2006)
| Abstract | According to the analysis of intentional action that Michael Bratman has dubbed the 'Simple View', intending to x is necessary for intentionally x-ing. Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that when people are presented with cases involving moral considerations, they are much more likely to judge that the action (or side effect) in question was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that the agent intended to do it. This suggests that at least as far as the ordinary concept of intentional action is concerned, an agent need not intend to x in order to x intentionally | |||||||||
| Keywords | INTENTIONAL ACTION MORAL RESPONSIBILITY ORDINARY LANGUAGE FOLK PSYCHOLOGY FREE WILL INTUITIONS JUDGMENT | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesFred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
Ezio Di Nucci (2010). Rational Constraints and the Simple View. Analysis 70 (3):481-486.
Eric Wiland (2007). Intentional Action and "in Order To". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2005). Skill, Luck, Control, and Intentional Action. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):341 – 352.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006). Desire, Foresight, Intentions, and Intentional Actions: Probing Folk Intuitions. Journal of Cognition and Culture.
Alfred R. Mele (2003). Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.
Hugh J. McCann (2005). Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.
Annie Steadman & Frederick Adams (2007). Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action. In C. Lumer & S. Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishers.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004). Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads37 ( #31,859 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
