The world of concrete contents

Inquiry 28 (1-4):417 – 428 (1985)
An attempt is made to find a coherent verbal expression of the intuition that reality is a manifold of more or less comprehensive wholes (gestalts), all discernible in terms of qualities. Quantitative natural science is thought to describe abstract structures of reality, not contents. The qualities are neither subjective nor objective, they belong to concrete contents with structures comprising at least three abstract relata: object, subject, and medium. Their status is that of entia rationis, not content of reality. Recent developments in physics suggest that we shall look in vain for physical ?things? of which reality is composed. Adequate expressions of concrete contents form designations rather than declarative sentences. They may obviously contain value terms. The attempt to formulate an ontology along the suggested lines seems to be closely related to phenomenology of a Heideggerian rather than Cartesian kind. It serves the endeavour to change the conception of the man?nature relationship
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DOI 10.1080/00201748508602059
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J. J. C. Smart (1961). Colours. Philosophy 36 (April-July):128-142.

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