David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The approach can be characterized at two somewhat independent levels. The first is the overall framework for the theory of meaning, and how this framework is integrated into linguistics, philosophy of language, and cognitive science (section 1). The second is the formal machinery that has been developed to achieve the goals of this framework (sections 2 and 3). The general framework might be realized in terms of other formal approaches, and many aspects of the formal machinery can empirically motivated within any framework for studying meaning.
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