Function and Mechanism: the metaphysics of neuroeconomics

Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2):197-205 (2010)
In this paper, I examine metaphysical aspects in the neuroeconomics debate. I propose that part of the debate can be better understood by supposing two metaphysical stances, mechanistic and functional. I characterize the two stances, and discuss their relations. I consider two models of framing, in order to illustrate how the features of mechanistic and functional stances figure in the practice of the sciences of individual decision making.
Keywords function  mechanism  neuroeconomics
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References found in this work BETA
Carl Craver & William Bechtel (2006). Mechanism. In J. Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Psychology Press. 469--478.
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