Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123 (2003)
|Abstract||Abstract In this paper I discuss one apparent counterexample to the rationality constraint on belief ascription. The fact that there are inconsistent believers does not seem compatible with the idea that only rational creatures can be ascribed beliefs. I consider Davidson's explanation of the possibility of inconsistent believers and claim that it involves a reformulation of the rationality constraint in terms of the believers' subscription to norms of rationality. I shall argue that Davidson's strategy is partially successful, but that the emphasis on the notion of subscription badly fits with the motivations behind his theory of interpretation|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Intentionality Without Rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.
Christian Beyer (2006). Mentale Simulation Und Radikale Interpretation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):25-45.
Patricia Marino (2011). Ambivalence, Valuational Inconsistency, and the Divided Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):41-71.
Gerhard Preyer (1998). Interpretation and Rationality: Steps From Radical Interpretation to the Externalism of Triangulation. Protosociology 11:245-260.
Kari Middleton (2007). The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
Colin Mcginn (1986). Radical Interpretation and Epistemology. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Lisa Bortolotti (2004). Can We Interpret Irrational Behavior? Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):359 - 375.
Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the Background of Rationality. Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #131,868 of 739,406 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,406 )
How can I increase my downloads?