David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press (2012)
To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain intuitive epistemic assessments while discounting others as misleading. This paper focuses on the viability of endorsing the legitimacy of Gettier intuitions while resisting the intuitive pull of skepticism – a combination of moves that most mainstream epistemologists find appealing. Awkwardly enough, the “good” Gettier intuitions and the “bad” skeptical intuitions seem to be equally strong. This chapter argues that it is not a coincidence that these two types of intuition register with equal force: they are generated by a common mechanism. However, the input to this mechanism is interestingly different in the two types of case, and different in a way that can support the mainstream view that Gettier cases tell us something about knowledge where skeptical intuitions involve systematic error.
|Keywords||intuition Gettier cases mindreading knowledge ascriptions skepticism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Mikkel Gerken (2015). The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.
Tomasz Wysocki (2016). Arguments Over Intuitions? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
Mikkel Gerken & James R. Beebe (2016). Knowledge in and Out of Contrast. Noûs 50 (1):133-164.
Similar books and articles
Jennifer Nagel (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Alan Musgrave (2012). Getting Over Gettier. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer
Brian Weatherson (2003). What Good Are Counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar (2013). Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs. Cognition 129:652-661.
Jim Stone (2013). 'Unlucky' Gettier Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):421-430.
Igor Douven (2005). A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):207-228.
John Turri (2012). Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
Stephen Hetherington (2011). Abnormality and Gettier Situations: An Explanatory Proposal. Ratio 24 (2):176-191.
Jennifer Nagel (2013). Motivating Williamson's Model Gettier Cases. Inquiry 56 (1):54-62.
Carol Mason Spicer (1996). Introduction. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 (4):ix-x.
Frank Jackson (2011). On Gettier Holdouts. Mind and Language 26 (4):468-481.
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747.
Jennifer Nagel (2013). Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.
Stephen Hetherington, Gettier Problems. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2011-05-12
Total downloads482 ( #2,465 of 1,911,741 )
Recent downloads (6 months)38 ( #20,594 of 1,911,741 )
How can I increase my downloads?