Note on mark Rowlands' externalism: Putting mind and world back together again
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In his new book, Rowlands defines externalism roughly as the thesis that ‘not all mental things are exclusively located inside the head of the person or creature that has these things’ (2). The book has two distinctive features. One is that while philosophers’ discussions of externalism tend to be very technical, Rowlands presents his own discussion in an accessible manner. The second, more distinctive than the first, is that Rowlands treats the concept of externalism as a topic in both analytic and continental traditions of philosophy.
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