David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (1986)
Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way: We can think about the world in terms that transcend our own experience or interest, and consider the world from a vantage point that is, in Nagel's words, "nowhere in particular". At the same time, each of us is a particular person in a particular place, each with his own "personal" view of the world, a view that we can recognize as just one aspect of the whole. How do we reconcile these two standpoints--intellectually, morally, and practically? To what extent are they irreconcilable and to what extent can they be integrated? Thomas Nagel's ambitious and lively book tackles this fundamental issue, arguing that our divided nature is the root of a whole range of philosophical problems, touching, as it does, every aspect of human life. He deals with its manifestations in such fields of philosophy as: the mind-body problem, personal identity, knowledge and skepticism, thought and reality, free will, ethics, the relation between moral and other values, the meaning of life, and death. Excessive objectification has been a malady of recent analytic philosophy, claims Nagel, it has led to implausible forms of reductionism in the philosophy of mind and elsewhere. The solution is not to inhibit the objectifying impulse, but to insist that it learn to live alongside the internal perspectives that cannot be either discarded or objectified. Reconciliation between the two standpoints, in the end, is not always possible
|Keywords||Appearance Epistemology Ethics Knowledge Metaphysics Objectivity Realism Scepticism Subjectivity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$7.88 used (76% off) $17.95 new (44% off) $24.19 direct from Amazon (25% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD220.N34 1986|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Iulian D. Toader (2015). Objectivity and Understanding: A New Reading of Carnap's Aufbau. Synthese 192 (5):1543-1557.
Max Velmans (1991). Is Human Information Processing Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Sharon Street (2006). A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Guy Kahane (2011). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Noûs 45 (1):103-125.
Similar books and articles
David R. Pugmire (1989). Bat or Batman. Philosophy 64 (April):207-17.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2002). Husserl and Nagel on Subjectivity and the Limits of Physical Objectivity. Continental Philosophy Review 35 (4):353-377.
Marilyn Friedman (1990). Going Nowhere: Nagel on Normative Objectivity: Discussion. Philosophy 65 (254):501-509.
Alan Thomas (2008). Thomas Nagel. Routledge.
Charles Taliaferro (1988). Nagel's Vista or Taking Subjectivity Seriously. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):393-401.
Larry D. Harwood (1997). The View From Nowhere and the Meaning of Life in Thomas Nagel. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 4 (3):19-23.
Norman Malcolm (1988). Subjectivity. Philosophy 63 (April):147-60.
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Naomi Eilan (2011). Experiential Objectivity. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press
Mark Silcox (2006). Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.
Panayot K. Butchvarov (1998). Skepticism About the External World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Daniel John Mcinerny (1994). The Place of Luck in Ethics: An Aristotelian Approach. Dissertation, The Catholic University of America
Thomas Nagel (1979). Subjective and Objective. In Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press 207-222.
Justin D’Arms (2005). Relationality, Relativism, and Realism About Moral Value. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (3):433 - 448.
John Kekes (1977). Physicalism and Subjectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):533-6.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads609 ( #612 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)43 ( #27,203 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?