Thomas versus Thomas: A new approach to Nagel's bat argument
Inquiry 46 (3):377-395 (2003)
| Abstract | i l l ustrat es t he di ffi cul t y of providing a purely physical characterisation of phenomenal experi ence wi t ha vi vi d exampl e about a bat ’ s sensory apparatus. Whi l e a number of obj ect i ons have al ready been made to Nagel.. | |||||||||
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L. Russow (1982). It's Not Like That to Be a Bat. Behaviorism 10:55-63.
Yujin Nagasawa (2008). God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments. Cambridge University Press.
Richard Double (1983). Nagel's Argument That Mental Properties Are Nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.
Terence Rajivan Edward (2009). Nagel on Concievability. Abstracta 5 (1):16-29.
Kathleen Wider (1990). Overtones of Solipsism in Thomas Nagel's "What is It Like to Be a Bat?" And the View From Nowhere. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):481-499.
Brie Gertler (2005). The Knowledge Argument. In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan.
Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Subjective Character of Experience in Medical Ethics: A Reply to Atkins. Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):219–223.
Michael Gorman (2005). Nagasawa Vs. Nagel: Omnipotence, Pseudo-Tasks, and a Recent Discussion of Nagel's Doubts About Physicalism. Inquiry 48 (5):436 – 447.
Torin Alter (2002). Nagel on Imagination and Physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:143-58.
Kathleen Wider (1989). Overtones of Solipsism in Nagel's 'What is It Like to Be a Bat?' And 'the View From Nowhere'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49:481-99.
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