What is it like to be a bat?

Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50 (1974)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Consciousness  Experience  Mental States  Metaphysics  Objective  Physicalism  Reductionism  Subjective  Kripke, S
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DOI 10.2307/2183914
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Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Max Velmans (1991). Is Human Information Processing Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.

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