Autonomous agency and the threat of social psychology
In M. Marraffa, M. Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Springer (2007)
| Abstract | This chapter discusses how research in situationist social psychology may pose largely undiscussed threats to autonomous agency, free will, and moral responsibility | |||||||||
| Keywords | situationism | |||||||||
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