Autonomous agency and the threat of social psychology

In M. Marraffa, M. Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Springer (2007)
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Abstract

This chapter discusses how research in situationist social psychology may pose largely undiscussed threats to autonomous agency, free will, and moral responsibility.

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2009-11-20

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Eddy Nahmias
Georgia State University

Citations of this work

The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
Skepticism about persons.John M. Doris - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.
Determination from Above.Kenneth Silver - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):237-251.
Situationism, going mental, and modal akrasia.Dylan Murray - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):711-736.

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