David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667 (2006)
Two intuitions lie at the heart of our conception of free will. One intuition locates free will in our ability to deliberate effectively and control our actions accordingly: the ‘Deliberation and Control’ (DC) condition. The other intuition is that free will requires the existence of alternative possibilities for choice: the AP condition. These intuitions seem to conflict when, for instance, we deliberate well to decide what to do, and we do not want it to be possible to act in some other way. I suggest that intuitions about the AP condition arise when we face ‘close calls,’ situations in which, after deliberating, we still do not know what we really want to do. Indeed, several incompatibilists suggest such close calls are necessary for free will. I challenge this suggestion by describing a ‘confident agent’ who, after deliberating, always feels confident about what to do (and can then control her actions accordingly). Because she maximally satisfies the DC condition, she does not face close calls, and the intuition that the AP condition is essential for free will does not seem to apply to her. I conclude that intuitions about the importance of the AP condition rest on our experiences of close calls and arise precisely to the extent that our deliberations fail to arrive at a clear decision. I then raise and respond to several objections to this thought experiment and its relevance to the free will debate
|Keywords||PERCEIVED FREEDOM RESPONSIBILITY|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
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Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Oisín Deery (2015). Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2033-2054.
Timothy Pawl (2014). The Freedom of Christ and the Problem of Deliberation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (3):233-247.
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