Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions.

In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan 189--215 (2010)
We discuss recent work in experimental philosophy on free will and moral responsibility and then present a new study. Our results suggest an error theory for incompatibilist intuitions. Most laypersons who take determinism to preclude free will and moral responsibility apparently do so because they mistakenly interpret determinism to involve fatalism or “bypassing” of agents’ relevant mental states. People who do not misunderstand determinism in this way tend to see it as compatible with free will and responsibility. We discuss why these results pose a challenge to incompatibilists.
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David Rose & Shaun Nichols (2013). The Lesson of Bypassing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2012). What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.

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Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Noa Latham (2004). Determinism, Randomness, and Value. Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.

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