Free Will and Responsibility

WIREs Cognitive Science 3 (4):439-449 (2012)
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Abstract

Free will is a set of capacities for conscious choice and control of actions and is essential for moral responsibility. While determinism is traditionally discussed as the main potential challenge to free will and responsibility, other potential challenges exist and need to be considered by philosophers and scientists. The cognitive sciences are relevant to free will both to study how people understand free will and potential challenges to it, and to study whether these challenges are supported by relevant scientific evidence.

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10.1086/205408

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Eddy Nahmias
Georgia State University

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