David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179 (2004)
Philosophers often suggest that their theories of free will are supported by our phenomenology. Just as their theories conflict, their descriptions of the phenomenology of free will often conflict as well. We suggest that this should motivate an effort to study the phenomenology of free will in a more systematic way that goes beyond merely the introspective reports of the philosophers themselves. After presenting three disputes about the phenomenology of free will, we survey the (limited) psychological research on the experiences relevant to the philosophical debates and then describe some pilot studies of our own with the aim of encouraging further research. The data seem to support compatibilist descriptions of the phenomenology more than libertarian descriptions. We conclude that the burden is on libertarians to find empirical support for their more demanding metaphysical theories with their more controversial phenomenological claims.
|Keywords||Free Will Phenomenology|
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Citations of this work BETA
Kirk Ludwig (2007). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments : First Person Versus Third Person Approaches. In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Blackwell Pub. Inc. 128-159.
Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28 - 53.
Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias (2007). The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
E. Schultz, E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz (2011). Persistent Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise Defense. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.
Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2009). Do Judgments About Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions About Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.
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