David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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A machine equivalent to Turing machine, that is more intuitive in its working is defined. Three derivation rules are added to Elementary Arithmetic of Godel and his incompleteness theorems are proved without using any metalanguage. Two axioms are added to Zermelo-Fraenkel theory to derive the Continuum Hypothesis and to split the unit interval into infinitesimals.
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