Action-oriented Perception

European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):430-446 (2012)
Abstract
Abstract: When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch-able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q-able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that in order to perform an action Q with respect to an object, we need to represent this object as Q-able and, second, I argue that we represent objects as having these properties perceptually
Keywords Perception  Higher order properties  Properties represented in perception  Action-properties  Action-oriented representation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,399
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Kent Bach (1978). A Representational Theory of Action. Philosophical Studies 34 (4):361 - 379.

View all 37 references

Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Shepherd (2012). Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.
Bence Nanay (2013). Success Semantics: The Sequel. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):151-165.

View all 6 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-05-28

Total downloads

128 ( #7,240 of 1,102,969 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #21,031 of 1,102,969 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.