Bayes or determinables? What does the bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions tell us about the nature of perceptual representation?

Abstract
The focus of this commentary is what Andy Clark takes to be the most groundbreaking of the philosophical import of the ‘bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions’, namely, the claim that perceptual representations represent probabilities. This is what makes his account Bayesian and this is a philosophical or theoretical conclusion that neuroscientists and psychologists are also quick and happy to draw. My claim is that nothing in the ‘bidirectional hierarchical models of brain functions’ implies that perceptual representations are probabilistic, or that they represent or ‘encode probability density distributions’. There is a much more parsimonious way of describing the representations in the bidirectional hierarchical model of brain functions: they attribute properties to objects (or to the perceived scene) that are not fully determinate.
Keywords Predictive coding  Bayesian neuroscience  Determinable properties  Perceptual representation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    M. Colombo & P. Series (2012). Bayes in the Brain--On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):697-723.
    Karl J. Friston (2005). Hallucinations and Perceptual Inference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):764-766.
    Bence Nanay (2012). Perceptual Phenomenology. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):235-246.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-11-30

    Total downloads

    16 ( #85,889 of 1,088,370 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    5 ( #19,987 of 1,088,370 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.