Do we see apples as edible?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):305-322 (2011)
Abstract
Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we see it as having certain shape, size and color and we only infer on the basis of these properties that it is. I argue that we do indeed see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I point out that Susanna Siegel's influential argument in favor of the claim that we represent sortal properties perceptually does not work. Second, I argue that we can fix this argument if we replace the sortal property in question with the property of being edible, climbable or Q-able in general
Keywords Perceptual content  Higher order properties  Properties represented in perception  Attention  Unilateral neglect
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Bence Nanay (2013). Success Semantics: The Sequel. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):151-165.
    Bence Nanay (2012). Perceptual Phenomenology. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):235-246.
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