Do we sense modalities with our sense modalities?

Ratio 24 (3):299-310 (2011)
Abstract
It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this assumption. On the first, extensional, interpretation whether we perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, intensional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not perceive dispositional properties. The two most important and influential arguments to the contrary fail
Keywords Perceptual content  Dispositional properties  Properties represented in perception
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References found in this work BETA
Kent Bach (1978). A Representational Theory of Action. Philosophical Studies 34 (4):361 - 379.
Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
Tyler Burge (1991). Vision and Intentional Content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell.

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Citations of this work BETA
Bence Nanay (2011). Perceiving Pictures. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):461-480.
Bence Nanay (2012). Perceptual Phenomenology. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):235-246.
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