Analysis 69 (3):499-502 (2009)
|Abstract||We can see a number of entities without seeing a determinate number of entities. For example, when we see the speckled hen, we do not see it as having a determinate number of speckles, although we do see it as having a lot of speckles. How is this possible? I suggest a contextualist answer that differs both from Michael Tye's and from Fred Dretske's.|
|Keywords||Perceptual content Perceptual experience Speckled hen Determinacy|
|Through your library||Configure|
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