Imagining, recognizing and discriminating: Reconsidering the ability hypothesis

Abstract
According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any other experience. I argue that if we replace the ability to imagine or recognize with the ability to discriminate, the Ability Hypothesis can be salvaged
Keywords Knowledge Argument  Ability Hypothesis  Imagination  Discrimination  Recognition
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References found in this work BETA
Austen Clark (2000). A Theory of Sentience. New York: Oxford University Press.

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