David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717 (2009)
According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any other experience. I argue that if we replace the ability to imagine or recognize with the ability to discriminate, the Ability Hypothesis can be salvaged
|Keywords||Knowledge Argument Ability Hypothesis Imagination Discrimination Recognition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Ryle (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Mohan P. Matthen (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.
Frank Jackson (1986). What Mary Didn't Know. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):291-5.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Bence Nanay (2009). Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
Torin Alter (2001). Know-How, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis. Theoria 67 (3):229-39.
Yuri Cath (2009). The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-How. Noûs 43 (1):137-156.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Knowledge Intuition and the Ability Hypothesis. Dialogue 51 (2):313-326.
Paul Noordhof (2003). Something Like Ability. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Michael Tye (2000). Knowing What It is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press 223.
D. H. Mellor (1993). Nothing Like Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:1-16.
Jennifer Van Reet, Ashley M. Pinkham & Angeline S. Lillard (2007). The Development of the Counterfactual Imagination. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):468-468.
Leslie F. Stevenson (2003). Twelve Conceptions of Imagination. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (3):238-59.
Beatrice Gelder (1988). Above Suspicion: Cognitive and Intentional Aspects of the Ability to Lie. [REVIEW] Argumentation 2 (1):77-87.
Evan Butts (2014). Slim Is In: An Argument for a Narrow Conception of Abilities in Epistemology. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:51-66.
Heidi L. Maibom (2010). Imagining Others. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 5 (1):34-49.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads90 ( #47,903 of 1,911,676 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #115,496 of 1,911,676 )
How can I increase my downloads?