David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717 (2009)
According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any other experience. I argue that if we replace the ability to imagine or recognize with the ability to discriminate, the Ability Hypothesis can be salvaged
|Keywords||Knowledge Argument Ability Hypothesis Imagination Discrimination Recognition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254.
Bence Nanay (2015). Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
Bence Nanay (2011). Replication Without Replicators. Synthese 179 (455):477.
Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254.
Similar books and articles
Bence Nanay (2009). Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
Torin Alter (2001). Know-How, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis. Theoria 67 (3):229-39.
Paul Noordhof (2003). Something Like Ability. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Knowledge Intuition and the Ability Hypothesis. Dialogue 51 (2):313-326.
D. H. Mellor (1993). Nothing Like Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:1-16.
Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Michael Tye (2000). Knowing What It is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press 223.
Brett Smith (2008). Imagining Being Disabled Through Playing Sport: The Body and Alterity as Limits to Imagining Others' Lives. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 2 (2):142 – 157.
Leslie F. Stevenson (2003). Twelve Conceptions of Imagination. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (3):238-59.
P. Joyce (2003). Imagining Experiences Correctly. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):361-370.
Shaun Nichols (2004). Imagining and Believing: The Promise of a Single Code. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):129-39.
Ephraim Glick (forthcoming). Abilities and Know-How Attributions. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), New Essays on Knowledge Ascriptions. OUP
Brian Kierland & Philip Swenson (2013). Ability-Based Objections to No-Best-World Arguments. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):669-683.
Luca Malatesti (2004). Knowing What It is Like and Knowing How. In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. John Benjamins 55--119.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads17 ( #213,899 of 1,796,421 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #206,825 of 1,796,421 )
How can I increase my downloads?