Naturalizing action theory

In Mark Sprevak & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave (2014)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to give a new argument for naturalized action theory. The sketch of the argument is the following: the immediate mental antecedents of actions, that is, the mental states that makes actions actions, are not normally accessible to introspection. But then we have no other option but to turn to the empirical sciences if we want to characterize and analyze them.
Keywords Naturalism  Philosophy of action  Pragmatic representation  Unconscious mental states
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