Perception and imagination: Amodal perception as mental imagery

Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254 (2010)
When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we represent the occluded parts of perceived objects by means of mental imagery. This conclusion could be thought of as a (weak) version of the Strawsonian dictum, according to which “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself”.
Keywords Amodal perception  Mental imagery  Perceptual presence
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DOI 10.2307/40856553
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Robert Cowan (2015). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Bence Nanay (2011). Perceiving Pictures. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):461-480.

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