David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):461-480 (2011)
I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of our experience of pictures: the “visual awareness not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of the representation.” I argue for the following four claims: (a) the depicted scene is represented by ventral perception, (b) the depicted scene is not represented by dorsal perception, (c) the picture surface is represented by dorsal perception, and (d) the picture surface is not necessarily represented by ventral perception
|Keywords||Picture perception Depiction Twofoldness Dorsal vision Ventral vision Pictures of pictures|
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References found in this work BETA
Dana Ballard (1996). On the Function of Visual Representation. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Silvano Zipoli Caiani (forthcoming). Extending the Notion of Affordance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
Alberto Voltolini (2013). Why, as Responsible for Figurativity, Seeing-in Can Only Be Inflected Seeing-In. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
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