Symmetry between the intentionality of minds and machines? The biological plausibility of Dennett's position

Minds and Machines 16 (1):57-71 (2006)
One of the most influential arguments against the claim that computers can think is that while our intentionality is intrinsic, that of computers is derived: it is parasitic on the intentionality of the programmer who designed the computer-program. Daniel Dennett chose a surprising strategy for arguing against this asymmetry: instead of denying that the intentionality of computers is derived, he endeavours to argue that human intentionality is derived too. I intend to examine that biological plausibility of Dennett’s suggestion and show that Dennett’s argument for the claim that human intentionality is derived because it was designed by natural selection is based on the misunderstanding of how natural selection works.
Keywords Computer  Intentionality  Machine  Mind  Natural Selection  Science  Dennett, Daniel
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-006-9013-7
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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Bence Nanay (2014). Teleosemantics Without Etiology. Philosophy of Science 81 (5):798-810.

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