The Monist 92 (1):112-132 (2009)
|Abstract||Theories of singular causation have a genuine problem with properties. In virtue of what property do events (or facts) cause other events? One possible answer to this question, Davidson’s, is that causal relations hold between particulars and properties play no role in the way a particular causes another. According to another, recently fashionable answer, in contrast, events cause other events in virtue of having a trope (as opposed to a property-type). Both views face serious objections. My aim in this paper is to combine these two very different solutions to the problem of the properties of singular causation and to argue that this combined view can avoid objections against both of them|
|Keywords||Tropes Davidson Singular causation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gurol Irzik (1990). Singular Causation and Law. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:537 - 543.
Peter Menzies (1989). Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis. Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663.
Christian Jakob (2006). Hitchcock's (2001) Treatment of Singular and General Causation. Minds and Machines 16 (3):277-287.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2012). Against the Contrastive Account of Singular Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1):115-143.
Tim Crane (2008). Causation and Determinable Properties : On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
Agustín Vicente (2001). Realization, Determination and Mental Causation. Theoria 16 (40):77-94.
Brad Weslake (forthcoming). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
Bence Nanay (2009). The Properties of Singular Causation. The Monist 92 (1):112-132.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #28,931 of 722,874 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #14,866 of 722,874 )
How can I increase my downloads?