David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The Monist 92 (1):112-132 (2009)
Theories of singular causation have a genuine problem with properties. In virtue of what property do events (or facts) cause other events? One possible answer to this question, Davidson’s, is that causal relations hold between particulars and properties play no role in the way a particular causes another. According to another, recently fashionable answer, in contrast, events cause other events in virtue of having a trope (as opposed to a property-type). Both views face serious objections. My aim in this paper is to combine these two very different solutions to the problem of the properties of singular causation and to argue that this combined view can avoid objections against both of them
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Bence Nanay (2012). Perceiving Tropes. Erkenntnis 77 (1):1-14.
Bence Nanay (2011). Do We Sense Modalities with Our Sense Modalities? Ratio 24 (3):299-310.
Bence Nanay (2010). Population Thinking as Trope Nominalism. Synthese 177 (1):91 - 109.
Bence Nanay (2011). Replication Without Replicators. Synthese 179 (455):477.
Similar books and articles
Bence Nanay (2009). The Properties of Singular Causation. The Monist 92 (1):112-132.
David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
Stuart Glennan (2010). Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):362-381.
S. C. Gibb (2004). The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):464-75.
María José García-Encinas (2011). Singular Causation Without Dispositions. Theoria 26 (1):35-50.
Stephen Yablo (1992). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Frank Hofmann (2007). Causal Powers, Realization, and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):173 - 182.
Wim de Muijnck (2002). Causation by Relational Properties. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):123-137.
Frank Jackson (1995). Essentialism, Mental Properties, and Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:253-268.
Anthony B. Dardis (2002). A No Causal Rivalry Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 17 (28):69-77.
Thomas D. Bontly (2005). Exclusion, Overdetermination, and the Nature of Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:261-282.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2012). Against the Contrastive Account of Singular Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1):115-143.
Manuel Liz Gutiérrez (2007). Enabling Relations As a Way to Transfer Causal Sufficiency. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:87-93.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads19 ( #167,199 of 1,781,480 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #96,728 of 1,781,480 )
How can I increase my downloads?