Well‐Ordered Science: Evidence for Use

Philosophy of Science 73 (5):981-990 (2006)
Abstract
This article agrees with Philip Kitcher that we should aim for a well-ordered science, one that answers the right questions in the right ways. Crucial to this is to address questions of use: Which scientific account is right for which system in which circumstances? This is a difficult question: evidence that may support a scientific claim in one context may not support it in another. Drawing on examples in physics and other sciences, this article argues that work on the warrant of theories in philosophy of science needs to change. Emphasis should move from the warrant of theories in the abstract to questions of evidence for use.
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DOI 10.1086/518803
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Galison (1990). How Experiments End. Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):103-106.

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Daniel J. Hicks (2015). Epistemological Depth in a GM Crops Controversy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 50:1-12.

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