The Relevance of Decision Theory to Ethical Theory

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):497-520 (2010)
Abstract
Morality for the purposes of this paper consists of sets of rules or principles intended for the general regulation of conduct for all. Intuitionist accounts of morality are rejected as making reasoned analysis of morals impossible. In many interactions, there is partial conflict and partial cooperation. From the general social point of view, the rational thing to propose is that we steer clear of conflict and promote cooperation. This is what it is rational to propose to reinforce, and to assist in reinforcing in society; it is not necessarily what it is individually rational to do. Even so, given the general situation, the rationality of its reinforcement will typically support the rationality of individual action as well. Game theory makes it possible to clarify these interactions, and these proposals for social solutions
Keywords Morals/morality  Rationality  Rational action  Intuitions  Interaction  Game  Game theory  Morals  Morality  Cooperation  Defection  Reinforcement  Prisoner’s dilemma  Chicken  Battle-of-the sexes  Pure coordination  Zero-sum
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Aristotle (2012). Nicomachean Ethics. Courier Dover Publications.

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