David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):25-34 (2000)
Functionalism argues that since any mental state can be realized by different physical systems, it is therefore wrong to define or identify a mental state of an organism by the corresponding physical-chemical state of its body . In this paper, I argue that since a single mental state can also be realized in different functional patterns, multiple realizability creates the same problem for functionalism. This means that it is wrong to implicitly define a mental state by its causal role in an interconnected network of inputs, outputs and internal states. It is discussed that the functionalists’ responses to this criticism are as plausible as the physicalists’ responses to the problem. It is concluded that in dealing with the multiple realizability problem, functionalism has no advantage over its rival, type physicalism
|Keywords||Body Chemistry Functionalism Mental Physics Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Brian P. Mclaughlin (2006). Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.
Dwayne Moore (2011). Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.
Marc A. Moffett (2010). Against a Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 83-106.
Marc Moffett (2010). Against A Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
Alan Weir (2001). More Trouble for Functionalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):267-293.
David Rose (2006). Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological and Neural Theories. Oxford University Press.
William Ramsey (2006). Multiple Realizability Intuitions and the Functionalist Conception of the Mind. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):53-73.
Sven Rosenkranz (2011). European Functionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):229 - 249.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #46,926 of 1,696,220 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #137,995 of 1,696,220 )
How can I increase my downloads?