Contingency, Necessity, and Causation in Kierkegaard's Theory of Change

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (1):141-162 (2012)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions explains certain of his claims about causation. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy

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Shannon Nason
Purdue University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Kierkegaard’s account of thought experiment: a method of variation.Eleanor Helms - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Kierkegaard on the transformative power of art.Antony Aumann - 2021 - History of European Ideas 47 (3):429-442.

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