Contingency, Necessity, and Causation in Kierkegaard's Theory of Change

In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions explains certain of his claims about causation. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy
Keywords Kierkegaard  Metaphysics  Philosophy of Religion  Change
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09608788.2011.650976
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,357
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Anna Sherratt (2001). Are the Laws of Logic Necessary or Contingent? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):379-384.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

59 ( #74,292 of 1,911,313 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #79,848 of 1,911,313 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.