Consciousness and commissurotomy:
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Three Hypothesized Dimensions of Deconnected Left-Hemispheric Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (1):37-67 (1992)
If a conception like the commissural-integrative conception of the normal stream of consciousness is correct, then we should expect to find that the consciousness of the deconnected left hemisphere is not a normal consciousness, because the right hemisphere cannot contribute to the left hemisphere's stream except by means of inadequate subcortical connections. Therefore, the present article considers, from the literature, three hypothesized dimensions of deconnected left-hemispheric consciousness: Is the deconnected left hemisphere alienated as agent from behavior produced by the respective right hemisphere? Or does the deconnected left hemisphere appropriate the latter behavior to the person, as it does behavior that the left hemisphere itself produces? Is the stream of consciousness of the deconnected left hemisphere more narrow and more disunified than the normal stream? Or is the left hemisphere's total state of consciousness of the moment just as rich as the normal stream, both in the part-experiences that comprise it and in awareness of relations among these part-experiences? Is the deconnected left hemisphere unaware of the commissurotomy-produced deficiencies characterizing its stream of consciousness? Or does the deconnected left hemisphere have awareness of what it, taking itself to be the whole person, can no longer accomplish? Discussion of these questions should go forward; they represent natural directions in which to investigate what is distinctive about left-hemispheric consciousness-which, the commissural-integrative view holds, has been produced by surgery
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