David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (2):191-212 (2014)
This essay is concerned with concentrations of entities, which play an important—albeit often overlooked—role in scientific explanation. First, I discuss an example from molecular biology to show that concentrations can play an irreducible causal role. Second, I provide a preliminary philosophical analysis of this causal role, suggesting some implications for extant theories of causation. I conclude by introducing the concept of causation by concentration, a form of statistical causation whose widespread presence throughout the sciences has been unduly neglected and which deserves to be studied in more depth. 1 Introduction2 Solving Lillie's Paradox: Lysogenic Induction in Phage λ3 Repressor Concentration and the Tuning of the Switch4 Concentration and Causality5 Preemption in Concentrations: Analysis and Implications6 Causation by Concentration: General Definition, Refinements, and Further Applications
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). Program Explanation: A General Perspective. Analysis 50 (2):107-17.
Philip Pettit (1996). Functional Explanation and Virtual Selection. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2):291-302.
Citations of this work BETA
Marco J. Nathan (2014). Molecular Ecosystems. Biology and Philosophy 29 (1):101-122.
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