David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1980)
A systematic study of rational or justified belief, which throws fresh light on current debates about foundations and coherence theories of knowledge, the validation of induction and moral scepticism. Dr Nathan focuses attention on the largely unsatisfiable desires for active and self-conscious assurance of truth liable to be engendered by philosophical reflection about total belief-systems and the sources of knowledge. He extracts a kernel of truth from the doctrine that a regress of justification is both necessary and impossible, contrasts the resultant scepticism with more familiar complaints about the inapplicability of supposedly essential cognitive concepts and explores the feasibility of non-Humean modes of consolation. This is an original and carefully constructed book, which will interest professional philosophers and advanced students of epistemology.
|Keywords||Evidence Justification (Theory of knowledge Belief and doubt Skepticism|
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Citations of this work BETA
David Shatz (1983). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit. Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
Laura Donohue & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1991). Years of Moral Epistemology: A Bibliography. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):217-229.
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Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
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Andrew Naylor (1983). Justification in Memory Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):269 - 286.
Angus Ross (1986). Why Do We Believe What We Are Told? Ratio (1):69-88.
Hamid Vahid (2009). The Epistemology of Belief. Palgrave Macmillan.
Stephen Hetherington, Fallibilism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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